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This special issue of Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies explores 
the relationship between taste, choice and social stratification in contemporary China. It 
is premised on the observation that the past thirty years of accelerated Reform policies 
have initiated a system of authoritarian capitalism, which fosters a network of social 
values, focussed on opportunity and struggle figured through financial achievement and 
consumption, and given affective meaning through nationalism. Not all Chinese enjoy 
the full gamut of these experiences, although most partake in struggle in some form. 
Opportunity arises mainly from the cultural capital, financial and social position of 
one’s parents, and, to some degree, from innate talent and hard work, an urban 
upbringing, and national provisions for educational advantage. Pre-existing forms of 
influence and power—local networks, Party membership, sufficient funds for 
education—are the strongest determinants of sustained success. In some cases, the 
opportunity for wealth creation has allowed some social mobility for entrepreneurial 
minds, whilst also re-establishing privilege amongst those whose status was already 
high through long term political or intellectual activity.  
 
Our research interviews in Sichuan and Guangzhou in 2005-2007 suggested that those 
who responded to the description xiaokang (well off) ranged from multi-millionaires, to 
couples with an architect designed home and access to expensive education for their 
child, to those who had scraped together enough to purchase an apartment in the city, 
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and perhaps a car. At the same time, cheap labour, domestic migration flows, the 
disestablishment of state owned enterprises and the welfare net that they represented, 
have thrust millions into uncertainty and the particular poverty of a precarious client 
relationship with the marketised State.  
 
Although the actual economics of status are not the main focus of this special issue, they 
are of course crucial to the conditions through which a newly forming idea of class, if 
not class itself, is managed and performed. In all of these discussions it is important to 
bear in mind that status does not necessarily translate into fixed class positions, but that 
class is generally characterised in part by high or low status. We are interested here not 
just in how an idea of class is made and unmade by wealth and relative poverty, but how 
it is claimed and reproduced through the actions of the State and of individuals, or 
indeed bypassed by short term self interest. Arguably, the absence of clearly defined 
class categories and attendant class interest groups and strategies makes the status 
seeking behaviour of Chinese elites, middle-income workers and the working poor even 
more important. One hypothesis for China’s idea of class might be that status is the end 
point of consumer endeavour, and that self-interest has deferred class interest. Further, 
the rise of nationalism and the central policy of harmonisation allow this deferral to 
continue, with the social energies of the people being deflected into larger scales of 
rhetorical belonging. Our question then might be: will the practice of taste 
differentiation gradually create mutually acknowledged social groups and relations, or is 
consumption hiding a chaotic and atomistic meltdown of the social and political order?  
 
Using the terminology of class is therefore vexed, and slippages occur easily. Erik 
Wright Olins has recently acknowledged that class is usefully theorised (in three 
traditions) vis-a-vis social position and economic opportunity, power and exploitation, 
materiality access and behaviour (2009: 102). All are relevant to the Chinese case, 
although we also suggest that class may be elided by the presumption of the State’s 
interests, even as these processes continue.  
 
A way into this conundrum might be to consider the degree to which class 
consciousness is at work in socio-political interactions. There are certainly levels of 
attainment and privilege in China, which are based on birth opportunity more than on 
inherent merit. Provincial origin and immediate family background still matter in one’s 
life chances. The poor are many and various however; if there is class consciousness 
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among them, it is sporadic and localised. There are also those who are not poor as such; 
they have average expectations for themselves and their children, and they might in 
other contexts be defined as working class. Now, they are inevitably caught up in the 
aspirational culture of a consumer driven urban market—which in turn determines the 
nature of their struggle and opportunity, and which also dissipates class interests in 
favour of the immediacy of adaption and survival. There are the well off, the rich, and 
the super-rich, and their sense of class is stronger insofar as they both understand their 
exposure to instability both politically and financially, and are able to work politically to 
protect themselves. Their grouping, the articulate elites in Reform China, is more an act 
of organisational will by the leadership of the Party than it is an organic achievement of 
the market, and these upper/middle populations are thus vulnerable to shifts in politics 
as well as to the vagaries of global finance. 
 
This last group is frequently lumped together as the new middle classes of China, a 
misnomer that nonetheless has purchase overseas, and that serves at home to ‘vanish’ 
real class description and potential from the political field. ‘When we speak of the 
‘Chinese middleclass,’ to whom and to what do we refer?’ asks Doctoroff, in his 
bestseller guide to marketing in China, Billions: Selling to the New Chinese Consumer 
(2005: 14). It is a question that is asked frequently in developed economies, as China’s 
new business partners look for points of familiarity to reconcile their worldview to the 
shift in global power. Whether or not the question is a reasonable one, it persists. The 
answer, for Doctoroff, is the populations referred to previously as the xiaokang, those 
who are enjoying increased wealth in urban areas, and whose class practices are 
rhetorically aligned to the key growth strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. Post-
reform affluence is in line with the blueprint for a future China launched by the 
Sixteenth-Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in November 2002. There, the 
‘parlance of the Sixteenth People’s Congress … wink [ed] at a robust, yet pliable, xiao 
kang (relatively wealthy) society’ (Doktoroff 2005: 14). China’s future would be built 
on the construction and stabilisation of a comprehensive ‘relatively affluent (xiaokang) 
society,’ with the understanding that over time there would be a steady increase in the 
national ratio of middle-income earners to the poor, thus marrying growth to social 
harmonisation. So, in defining middle class-ness in China, Doctoroff describes a policy 
situation that defuses class interests in favour of a national interest strategy described by 
state capitalism and authoritarian developmentalism. The idea of middle-class-ness is an 
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anti-class deployment of status and economic survival for a large minority. The voices 
of the well-off, the wealthy and the rich combine to drown out the voices of the poor, 
whilst promising a nationally inspired parity for everyone. Again a paradox, it is the 
exploitation model of class used to deny class division at the level of the nation’s self-
image. 
 
The new utopia 
The Party’s vision of a harmonious xiaokang one-class/no-class society responds to the 
need to consolidate and harness the successes of the economic reform, and addresses the 
traumatic social differentiations that have been caused in the process. ‘Harmonious 
society’ promises redress, over time, for the increasing gap between the rich and poor. 
In this sense the Chinese middleclass-to-be is similar to the new middle classes of other 
areas of recent affluence in Asia, described by Stivens as ‘the children of these 
hypertrophic states’ (1998: 13). They are both real and important, but not quite what 
they are made out to be in the political rhetoric of the State. These are not the middle 
classes in the sense that they are challenging a ruling class; they are rather commanded 
and compounded as a legitimising product and constituent of the ruling elite’s political 
and economic power. The inclusion of their relative success is crucial to the 
narrativisation of China’s economic miracle.  
 
The rhetorical insistence on harmonising economic disparity and social difference 
reveals both political anxiety and a new Utopian vision. In some quarters, it reinvokes 
the spectre of old-style class conflict, which has been the cause and subject of deeply 
violent episodes over the past century. Elsewhere, this ‘wink’ at class opens up new 
commercial and personal opportunities. It promises access to the dollars of economic 
reform, through a newly mobile social field and competitive cultural aspirations. 
 
Different urban and provincial environments, and alternative developmental rates and 
opportunities are obvious but not theorised in Party rhetoric. The Chinese 
middleclass(es) as an idea is thus an approximate vision of the new Chinese Utopia. 
While in popular, especially commercially driven, representation it is often used to 
signal ‘all that is desirable and tasteful in life’ (Chen & Yi 2004: 1), politically it is 
spelled out as a foundational project by the leaders of State-Planning Bureaux. In a 
forum called ‘Cutting-Edge Academic Discussions’ in Beijing 2002, for example, the 
Vice-Director of the State Bureau for Statistics He Ken stated that ‘middleclass’ should 
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signify ‘relative affluence’ and ‘civilised.’ It should be a social stratum that will form 
the mainstay of the citizens of a future Chinese xiaokang society. As leading members 
of a ‘relatively affluent’ future China, he further elaborates, the middle class should be 
not only economically well off, but also high in spiritual-cultural quality (jingshen 
wenhua suzhi). 
 
Middle-class-making, as the foundational project for post-reform affluent China, not 
only depends on State-led economic development, but also involves normative cultural 
practices which necessitate the active participation of the State and society at large, 
from the economic sectors to individual aspirants. Taste is thus allied to social value and 
in turn to the harmonisation of cultural and political behaviours. 
 
Post-Mao 
Class conceptualisation in China is not necessarily only tied to social stratification and 
economic divisions, which of course also exist and have done so in the past. It is also 
about the harmonious ordering of the social body as a tapestry of correct behaviours and 
placements. Such social ordering was corrupted in the recent history of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Mao Zedong’s class analysis and social categorisation 
oscillated between self-serving political strategies, and the notion of class struggle 
became the basis for endless campaigns against enemies of the Party-State (Schram 
1984). Maoist class struggle did not refer to active social divisions but to roughly 
applied concepts of blood lineage, and expediency. Mao’s notion of class is thus 
inherited but deviates from its classical Chinese precedent. Jieji, the neologism for class 
in modern standard Chinese is taken from modern Japanese, which in turn was 
translated from classical Chinese. It denotes distinction and structural classification but 
in a different sense. While jieji originally connotes ‘hierarchical degrees on a 
continuum’ (Kuhn 1984: 17), it does not classify groups of people but mark their places 
in a given order. In its early form it points to a fixed order of aristocratic distinction, 
‘linked to a routinized system of political preferment’ (Kuhn 1984: 17). The important 
point here is that classically jieji highlights distinction based on political preferment.  
 
But though the image of jieji as fixed degrees in a continuum persisted, its actual 
reference changes in time. The use of jieji has its own history. For instance, ‘by late 
imperial times, the meaning of ji had shifted entirely away from inherited aristocratic 
status and was associated with the eighteenth-rank system of bureaucratic distinctions’ 
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(Kuhn 1984: 18). This suggests that since late imperial times (1368-1912) jieji was no 
longer a fixed system of distinction in China, as advancement in bureaucratic distinction 
through personal political effort, rather than through birthright, became the determining 
factor in social classification. It was not a system that relied on inherited social origins; 
but, while prioritising political preferment, it also presupposed, in fact, relied on, social 
mobility based on education and practices of personal as well as group cultivation. The 
economic factor only figured indirectly in this shifting grid of preferment and status, 
though that also became increasingly important. The jieji system of distinction was 
generally supplemented by the division of society into occupational status groups, such 
as the four categories of shi nong gong shang: scholar-gentry, agriculturalists, artisans, 
and merchants. If this latter socially hierarchical system was economically 
differentiated, it was so in terms of a universal economic priority determined by the 
State’s fiscal interest rather than by individual or group wealth (Kuhn 1984: 20). When 
Liang Qichao first used the term in 1899 to introduce European thought on social and 
economic power through Japanese interpretation, he meant it as the gradient that 
separated society whilst binding it closely together (Liang quoted in Kuhn 1984: 20). 
This first ‘modern’ use of class is still more akin to a grading system rather than a social 
grouping based on economic status. 
 
Mao’s grasp and articulation of Chinese social relations in the twentieth century 
centered on class and class struggle. As an absolute principle it steered half a century of 
Chinese political and social life. This was a combination of the Marxist precept of 
economically determined class, and the shifting politically volatile grid of jieji, which 
was both exploitative and socially imagined. Its deployment was thus contingent and 
fraught with conceptual contradictions and political tension. That tension continues 
today, but the focus is on consumption of goods and the production of national wealth 
within a discourse of State legitimation, rather than on the incorporation of political 
doctrine into the self as an end and means. The self is still a political body, but the 




In debates on class and social stratification outside the Chinese system, there is common 
reference to Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisation of ‘the habitus’ (1984: 169). By situating 
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discrete lifestyles and practices of cultural distinction in ‘the social space’ (1984: 169), 
Bourdieu’s formulation, based on empirical sociological studies of twentieth century 
French class culture, retains the notion of structural change but redefines it as a process 
of social historical formation. The focus on the social space of culture and lifestyles 
highlights that sociocultural relations are cultivated, lived and embodied. It makes clear 
how they take on a particular form, which correlates with, but is not reducible to, 
economic capital. Bourdieu’s theorisation, while offering insights into the social 
formation of French society at a given period, provides at the same time a useful 
analytical grid for thinking about the interrelation between particular cultural forms and 
long term sociohistorical structural change. Its emphasis on the importance of social 
origins as a determining factor in cultural distinction, and its relative reliance on the 
historical longue durée, however, makes it unable to serve as a complete model for 
understanding post-socialist Chinese social formation and cultural distinction. So, this 
collection goes beyond Bourdieu in that while we recognise the importance of his work 
for drawing attention to the cultural, we must insist on the specificity of the local 
conditions of Chinese social systems and political expedients in bringing the cultural to 
a new fruition. 
 
Post-socialist Chinese social restratification, for instance, as one direct consequence of 
the Party-State’s reform policy, demonstrates dramatic time compression—a condition 
neither understood nor elaborated in Bourdieu’s model. Problems of disadvantage and 
inequality are to be expected in accelerated development. The Chinese State offers 
normative social and cultural programs of betterment as a palliative to disadvantage, 
such as the various campaigns (in the 1980s, 1990s and through till today) to cultivate 
spiritual quality of the population at large, and the popularisation of the vision for a 
‘harmonious society’ based on the coming-to-be of a middleclass-centered society, 
which has been the key rhetorical impulse to policy design in the present century. 
 
In recent academic work on middleclass formation and its significance in China, very 
few analysts find that the structural foundations of a middleclass-centered society are in 
place (Lu Xueyi 2002). But many critics conclude that those who loosely fit the 
descriptor of the new one-class are largely urban, and that a majority is concentrated in 
State-controlled professions and institutions, surpassing the more visible management 
personnel or white-collar workers for foreign cooperations and private entrepreneurs (Li 
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Chunlin 2005: 510). The implications of this ‘middleclass formation with Chinese 
characteristics’ are two-fold. First, the concentration of metropolitans in key, often 
State-related, professions, makes clear again that the emergence of middle class 
interests in post-socialist urban China is closely tied to the State. Second, as insiders of 
economic, governing or professional bodies they can more easily influence government 
policies and initiatives, and as a consequence move their own emerging collective 
interests and aspirations into the social mainstream. Their envisioned function is thus 
exemplary to society at large, even though they also represent discrete clusters of 
political or social interests.  
 
What also emerges from these observations is that this body of ‘class’ influence is most 
obviously demonstrated in the cultural arena. Urban avant-gardes and trend-setters—
such as elite media industry personnel, government cultural agency workers, State-
sector and multinational business professionals—control the soft media. They lead 
social and cultural fashions, and have the means to spread their attitudes and value 
systems to the whole society. Under such circumstances, though their numbers are 
limited, and their cultural values cannot function to provide comprehensive social 
cohesion, nevertheless they represent an expansive cultural tendency that operates as a 
political and social force for the maintenance of the State (Li 2005: 511).  
 
Contributions to the special issue 
This special issue seeks to locate and describe how the newly forming class interests of 
the wealthy and aspirational emerge both as exemplars and as aspirants to the security 
of the new utopia. The papers include contributions covering aspects of post-reform1 
social stratification and cultural formation, and which reflect on the significance of 
reinvention and resurgence of class discourses in the realms of culture, social 
consciousness, and commercial practice. The issues are dealt with both at the macro-
political and the micro-everyday level. Together the papers shed light on specific 
configurations of the category of class and the role of status in a post-Bourdieu and 
post-Mao context.  
 
                                                
1 Whilst the reform era started after the death of Mao in 1976 and took distinctive shape as a result of new 
economic policies under Deng Xiaoping from 1978, post-reform is more nebulous: it refers to the mid-
late 1990s and the 2000s—as the results of change on the organisation of daily life become more 
apparent. For a short contextual overview of this era and its implications for ‘class-ness’ and gender, see 
Donald and Zheng (2009: 501-3). 
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In ‘Life Spectacles: Media, Business Synergy and Affective Work in Neoliberal China,’ 
Hai Ren examines the way in which Chinese media communicate the meanings of 
everyday life. He also discusses how operators of theme parks, theme shopping malls, 
and residential communities deploy spatial planning and engineering techniques to train 
their users to behave like appropriate citizens in an ideal one-class society. Ren makes 
clear that his analysis is set against the backdrop of China’s gaige kaifang (reform and 
opening) policy since the late 1970s, which extracted individuals from the social 
institutions developed under socialism and re-embedded them within a new socio-
political system. The essay demonstrates that within the social space by which the 
State’s middle/one class project is envisioned, not only are the institutional structures of 
socialist China disappearing but forms of practical knowledge, common sense, and 
guiding norms associated with socialism are no longer legitimate tools of empowerment. 
 
Nyiri Pál’s cultural anthropological study, ‘From Starbucks to Carrefour: Consumer 
Boycotts, Nationalism and Taste in Contemporary China,’ probes the motivations 
behind the series of nationwide consumer boycott campaigns against several foreign 
companies in the 2000s. The article discusses the dynamics of consumer boycotts and 
asks whether, beyond being a vehicle of nationalism, the emerging politics of 
consumption is also becoming a tool of expressing emergent class taste. Nyiri observes 
that the Chinese case is different from the cultural politics of the Soviet Union or 
Eastern Europe under state socialism, where cultural protectionism tended to be a 
preserve of the high priests of high culture. In China, attempts to link a highbrow 
discourse of taste with cultural protectionism find less resonance with nationalists, and 
their effects are harder to predict. In Nyiri’s analysis, the recent proliferation of 
consumer boycotts is part and parcel of the wave of popular nationalism in China that is 
subject to the complex symbiosis between market and State in which the official 
discourse of the nation is coopted in commercial advertising and percolates down to 
Internet bulletin boards. Nyiri concludes that, although there is ample evidence of state 
manipulation and control of consumer nationalism, the boycotts have been grassroots 
movements. The politics of consumption are moving to the centre of Chinese 
nationalism; and they provide an arena for emerging discourses of taste that allow 
individuals to sidestep or modify dominant versions of the State and the nation. 
 
Luigi Tomba’s essay looks directly at the production of a Chinese middle class during 
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the Reform period and the factors that have contributed to it. He highlights the role of a 
growing group of big spenders and consumers in China’s economic growth and political 
stability. Tomba argues that a dramatic status enhancement for wage-earning Chinese 
professionals has been among the major determinants of social change in the late 1990s 
and that this process happened despite the market more than because of it. Tomba’s 
essay shows that the development of a high-consuming urban society has been as much 
the outcome of the social engineering project of the contemporary reformist state and its 
agencies as it has been a consequence of the opening up of the economy and society. 
 
In the section ‘New Perspectives Reports,’ our two authors engage directly with cultural 
debates in PRC on class taste, the media and social change. Their cultural commentaries 
reflect on post-reform social restratification and the resurgence of class culture. In his 
case report and analysis ‘Mapping Society: the New Function of Print Media in 
Mainland China—the Case of New Weekly,’ Xiaolu Wang links the changing aims and 
functions of Chinese print media today with the conceptual and social changes of PRC 
intellectuals as a knowledge class. New Weekly is one of the most influential illustrated 
Chinese magazines focusing on social issues and phenomena. Analysing the magazine’s 
design and content, the author argues that the taste-based innovations of new Chinese 
print media reflect the changes in social formation and conceptual shifts of the 
intellectual class.  
 
Songyu Lin’s ‘Mix and Match or Confusion?: Middleclass Taste in China’ also looks 
into the contested terrain of taste formation in the popular media. Examining in 
particular the so-called fiction of petit bourgeoisie sentiments, popular among white-
collared workers and young aspirants to new iterations of tasteful lifestyles, Lin points 
out that cultural trends and taste patterns refer also to the influence and interests of old 
cultural traditions, post-authoritarian polity and the new State-capitalist economy. The 
mix and match, or flagrant confusion, in matters of class and taste, testify not only to the 
obvious spiritual homelessness of a post-socialist society, but more importantly 
foreground the contest for social and cultural leadership in the one-class or middle-class 
utopia. Lin concurs with some of the leading Chinese cultural critics that we are 
witnessing the emergence of a taste elite, comprising the new generation of highly 
educated youth, who seek to benefit from post-Reform economy and polity.  
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In all these papers, the use of the term middle class is strategic rather than absolute, 
insofar as the term already refers to an empty categorisation, and a shifting set of 
practices, habits and aspirations. The use of the term is nonetheless helpful in that, 
although it does not indicate a class structure or indeed class habits familiar to other 
societies (or not necessarily), it aptly captures both the deployment and elision of class 




This introduction and the special issue of PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies is a 
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